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In this study, we examine how the classic elements of affect, cognition, and behaviour
combine to form within-person trajectories of organizational commitment. We test
several key features of this ‘dynamic microstructure’ of commitment in an experience
sampling setting (25 weekly measurements) among 72 organizational entrants and 23
exiters. We find support for the idea that within-person change in affect is slower than
within-person change in cognition and behaviour.We find no support for the notion that
affect would influence cognition and behaviour at the within-person level. In fact, we have
strong indications that the episodes of committing (organizational entry) and uncom-
mitting (organizational exit) aremainly cognition driven.Wediscuss the implications of our
study for tripartite attitude theory and commitment theory.
Practitioner points
 Organizational commitment can generally best be fostered via rational appeals. If a long-term
investment and sustained commitment is called for, emotional appeals work best.
 Alumni officersmay sufficewith focusing purely on emotive appeals in upholding residual commitments
of their alumni.
The current research on commitment is predominantly concerned about static cause–
effect relationships (‘what causes what’) and does not detail how the most basic
ingredients of commitment – affect, cognition, and behaviour – relate over time. This is a
pity, because such research is highly actionable (Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de
Ven, 2013). For example, if the affective base of commitment is more resistant to change
and more prominent after employees have left the organization (evidenced here), then
alumni officers should focus on emotional appealswhenmaking their requests. To be able
to give such actionable advice, one must first do basic research and develop a theory on
how the dynamic microstructure of commitment works. The major goal of this study is
therefore to examine how the classic elements of attitude – the affective, cognitive, and
behavioural types of attitudinal information – combine to form trajectories of organiza-
tional commitment. We draw inspiration from general attitudes literature to formulate
hypotheses on how the separate elements are causally linked and how their development
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may or may not diverge. Next, we empirically test the resulting hypotheses using an
experience sampling design (25 weekly measurements).
Theoretically, this study extends the tripartite perspective of attitude, by showing that
the three bases of attitude relate to one another dynamically. In particular, we
demonstrate that the relative salience of the affective, cognitive, and behavioural bases of
attitude is not fixed, but can change over time and context. Also, by drawing inspiration
from the dual-process theory of attitude,we demonstrate that the affective base of attitude
changes at a slower rate compared to the cognitive and behavioural bases. Such new
knowledge on the attitudinal microstructure connects to substantive discussions
regarding the place of affect, cognition, and behaviour in the emergence of commitment
(e.g., Brickman, 1987; Brown, 1996; Judge&Kammeyer-Mueller, 2012;Kell&Motowidlo,
2012; Klein, Molloy, & Brinsfield, 2012; Solinger, Van Olffen, & Roe, 2008). Namely, our
results indeed substantiate the view of commitment as a cognition-based attitude, where
(un)committing to the organization seems to result from a conscious choice to do so.
Theory and hypotheses
A brief overview of the organizational commitment literature
An ongoing debate in the commitment literature revolves around what organizational
commitment really means (Becker, Klein, & Meyer, 2009). Historically, a commitment
was a solemn vowof service toGod, romantic partners, or other objects that are important
to the self (Ashman & Winstanley, 2006; Schlesinger, 2008). Since its introduction to
managerial arenas in the second half of the 20th century, the term commitment became
focused on the ‘organization’ as a focal object of one’s service. This led to quite a dynamic
shift in meaning. To organizational scholars, a commitment was seen as a prime
explanation for why some desire to remain employed while others do not (e.g., Allen &
Meyer, 1990; Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982). Different theories on why people commit
to organizations emerged, emphasizing commitment as an affective attachment, as a
calculative cost-benefit analysis, or as a moral bond with the employer (Allen & Meyer,
1990; for a review). To integrate these theories, organizational commitment was
re-defined as combination of three ‘bases’: An affective base (‘I want to stay’), a normative
base (‘I feel I ought to stay’) and a continuance base (‘I need to stay’; Allen&Meyer, 1990).
While the affective base of commitment has been generally well supported by empirical
evidence (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & Topolnytsksy, 2002; Solinger et al., 2008), the
two other bases remained controversial. This led some critical commitment scholars to
conclude that normative and continuance bases should no longer be seen as parts of
commitment, but as distinct motivations to remain employed (Klein et al., 2012; Solinger
et al., 2008).
Several re-definitions of commitment have since entered the debate. One approach
presents commitment as a one-dimensional construct where commitment is seen as a
psychological bond which is expressed by a dedication to and responsibility for a target
(Klein et al., 2012). Another approach is to define commitment in strictly attitudinal
terms, where commitment is ‘an attitude of an employee vis-a-vis the organization,
reflected in a combination of affect (emotional attachment, identification), cognition
(identification and internalization of its goals, norms, and values), and action readiness (a
generalized behavioral pledge to serve and enhance the organization’s interests)’
(Solinger et al., 2008.p. 80; see also Judge & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2012). In this study, we
build on and extend the attitudinal view of commitment. As an aside, an attitudinal
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definition of commitment is consistent with early and influential work on commitment
(e.g., Buchanan, 1974; Mowday et al., 1982) and with recent empirical evidence (e.g.,
Harrison, Newman,&Roth, 2006). Moreover, seeing commitment as an attitude opens up
great theorizing opportunities because it connects to a very rich literature on general
attitudes in social psychology. The attitudinal definition of commitment resembleswhat is
known as ‘affective commitment’ in the earlier three-component model of organizational
commitment (Allen & Meyer, 1990). Note that Allen and Meyer’s (1990) ‘affective
commitment’ refers to the commitment attitude as a whole. This should not be confused
with our use of the term ‘the affective base of attitude’, which only denotes affective
information in the dynamic microstructure of commitment.
General attitudes theory on the tripartite attitude structure
An attitude is classically defined as a psychological tendency to evaluate an object [i.e.,
the organization] with a particular degree of favour or disfavour (Eagly & Chaiken,
1993.p.1, parentheses added). This definition is quite open and still permits awide array of
theories on how attitudes operate (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007), such as dual-process theory
(Bohner & Dickel, 2011), connectionist perspectives (e.g., Smith, 1996), and the most
classic theory of attitude, which is tripartite attitude theory (our focus). Tripartite attitude
theory assumes that individuals develop attitudes on the basis of three types of
information: Affective, cognitive, and behavioural information (Albarracin, Johnson, &
Zanna, 2005; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fabrigar, MacDonald, & Wegener, 2005; Petty,
Wegener, & Fabribar, 1997; Zanna & Rempel, 1988).
In tripartite attitude theory, the affective base of attitude refers to learnt feelings
towards an object, called evaluative affect (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, &
Crombez, 2010). For example, if one hates the employing organization (i.e., negative
evaluative affect), frustration, anger, or fear are learnt emotive reactions to the
organization. The cognitive base of attitude refers to mental operations that associate
the object (i.e., organization) with a truth statement (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). For
example, if one thinks: ‘My organization is corrupt’, this represents a truth statement
about the organization. Finally, the general tendency to approach or avoid contact
with the organization (as in volunteering or shirking) is viewed as a behavioural base of the
attitude. In attitude theory, the behavioural base comprisesmore than just overt behaviour.
It also includes intentions to act; it includes a desire to approach/support or avoid/destroy
an object in some way; and it includes activation, which is being ready for action but not
knowing what action (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Breckler, 1984; Frijda, 1988).
Our contribution to the tripartite view of attitude is that we re-interpret it from a
dynamic viewpoint. For example, a (within person) trajectory of commitmentmight have
an affective ‘flavour’ (affect is high, while cognition and behaviour are low) if affective
information is the most salient during a given span of time, such as when saying goodbye
to leave the organization. At another point in time, cognition and behaviour may be high,
while affect low, such as when one has just joined a new organization and started to
assume responsibilities, but one still needs to develop affective attachments with the
people in the organization.
In Industrial and Organizational Psychology, affect, cognition, and behaviour are
sometimes treated as separate constructs (Johnson, Morgeson, & Hekman, 2012; Klein
et al., 2012; Schleicher, Watt, & Greguras, 2004; Weiss, 2002) and sometimes as latent
subcomponents of attitude (Breckler, 1984). Our own position is the following: If one is
interested in the overall attitude only (i.e., organizational commitment), researchers
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usually suffice with a summary measure where affective, cognitive, and behavioural
information is mixed (Petty et al., 1997). However, if one is interested in how different
bases of information combine tomake a trajectory of commitment (aswe are), then affect,
cognition, and behaviour should be treated as separate constructs.
The relative development of trajectories in the dynamic microstructure
Thinking of attitudes in dynamic terms requires process thinkingwhere theory is aimed at
understanding how something emerges, changes, and declines within persons over time
(cf. Langley et al., 2013). Unfortunately, process thinking in Industrial andOrganizational
Psychology sciences is severely underdeveloped, especially among the quantitative
studies (Langley et al., 2013). At this moment, we need to work with what is available. In
the area of attitudes, we have found a process theory in dual-process models of attitude
structure (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). We therefore
choose to develop our expectations from there.
Attitudes change within persons over time when a person’s experiences with the
attitude object accumulate (Allport, 1935; Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Fabrigar et al.,
2005). In that sense, attitudes are like reservoirs of impressions that have been filled up
through interactions with the object. Dual-process theory holds that attitudes develop by
way of two different learning mechanisms, namely learning based on automatic
association and learning based on reasoning (Bohner &Dickel, 2011). Automatic learning
is responsible for shaping the learning of affective reactions to an object. This assumed
connection is based on evidence from neuropsychological studies where automatic
attitudes have repeatedly been associated with activity taking place in the subcortical
brain, locations in which affective processes (more so than cognitive processes) are
implicated (Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson 2004; €Ohman,
2002; Phelps et al., 2000; Zald, 2003).Affective learning can therefore be seen as a type of
learning, which is associative and driven by conditioning processes (Hofmann et al.,
2010). For example, one learns to react affectively to an organizationwhen ‘coming to the
office’ (neutral stimulus) is consistently paired with ‘feeling good, happy, or proud’
(unconditioned response). Over time, one simply needs to think of the organization
(conditioned stimulus) to feel happy, or proud (conditioned response). Learning in this
mode occurs automatically with awareness only of the result of processing (e.g., being
aware that you feel proud when you think of the organization) and it builds up only
gradually over repeated instances of exposure1 with the organization (cf. Hofmann et al.,
2010; Smith & DeCoster, 2000).
Our argument that affective learning is slower seems counterintuitive. We would
normally reason that feeling sensations like fear, joy, disgust, or anger come and go rather
quickly while cognitions and behaviours seem to be more stable. The upshot here is that
the affective element of attitude (evaluative affect; see Hofmann et al., 2010) is a
particular kind of affect, which behaves differently compared to the more general affect,
which also includes emotions. The difference is that evaluative affect towards objects is
learnt (and accumulates through association mechanisms) and, thus, has a more
permanent quality, while more general feelings like fear, joy, disgust, or anger are not
1We thank an anonymous reviewer for noting that in exceptional instances, the association is so positive or negative that affective
learning happens instantly. For example, a traumatic experience in the organization can cause employees to turnover, just as
repeated negative experiences can (see Lee &Mitchell, 1994). In our view, instant learning of affective information is exceptional
while gradual accumulation of experience is the rule.
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learnt and, thus, are more ephemeral. For more information on evaluative affect and the
role of automatic learning (conditioning), see Hofmann et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis.
‘Controlled’ learning, in contrast, adjusts through cognitive effort, that is: Through (re)
thinking and reasoning, where the individual develops new judgments about the
organization (cf. Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). As
opposed to affective learning, cognitive learning happens via language and logic,
involving more cortical brain activity (e.g., Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Cunningham,
Raye, & Johnson 2004). New information can be learnt quickly and is incorporated in just
one or a few experiences. This contrasts with affective learning discussed earlier, which
usually takes a considerable number of trials (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). More controlled
learning occurs when capacity and motivation are present, and one is generally aware of
these steps of processing (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). For this reason, typical behavioural
responses of the controlled learning system are more complex, nuanced, contemplated,
consciously endorsed, and hencemore sensitive to context, personal long-term goals, and
social desirability (Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004; Cunningham, Johnson et al.,
2004; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006;Wilson et al., 2000). Thus, the automatic system
is characterized by ‘quick reaction and slow learning’, whereas the controlled system is
characterized by ‘slow reaction and quick learning’ (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack &
Deutsch, 2004). In short, what we learn from combining dual-process and tripartite
attitude theory is that affective learning is relatively slow and associative while cognitive
learning is relatively fast and reflective.
Hypothesis 1a: The affective base of the attitude microstructure will demonstrate a
slower pace of change than the cognitive base.
Up to this point, it is unclear how the behavioural base of attitude should be
considered. In attitude literature, behaviour has mainly been treated as a behavioural
intention (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Armitage & Conner, 2001), which implies a relatively
‘controlled’ process. In linewith this general attitudes view, commitment is an investment
in the group that one is part of. This investment in the group (‘committing oneself’) results
from a deliberate choice to do so (Klein et al., 2012). A commitment is a ‘pledge’ to serve
one’s long-term goals with regard to an entity (Brickman, 1987; Brown, 1996; Roe,
Solinger, & Van Olffen, 2009; Solinger et al., 2008). Given this self-regulatory function of
commitment, we expect that behaviour dynamically gravitates towards ‘cognition’
(controlled attitude) more than towards ‘affect’ (automatic attitude). Therefore, we
expect cognition and behaviour to show greater within-person similarity across time than
cognition–affect and behaviour–affect.
Hypothesis 1b: Within-person trajectories of the cognitive and behavioural bases of the
attitude microstructure correlate more strongly than do the cogni-
tive-affective and behavioural-affective trajectories.
Temporal influence relationships in the dynamic microstructure of attitude
Having established differences in the rates of change in the dynamic microstructure of
commitment, it is now time to examine which element temporally influences the
others. Available theories, however, are equivocal. In particular, attitude-behaviour
models, neuropsychology, and cognitive dissonance theory argue for the primacy of
cognition, affect, and behaviour, respectively. Below, we attempt to synthesize these
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insights and formulate the most likely temporal influence model for organizational
commitment.
Fishbein &Ajzen’s theory of planned behaviour is perhaps themost established theory
involving affect, cognition, and behaviour in psychology literature (Ajzen & Fishbein,
1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1991). It outlines the connections of affect and
cognition first to an intention and subsequently to actual behaviour. Behavioural intention
is central in the theory (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Intentions are defined as individuals’
willingness to try to exert effort to perform the focal behaviour (Ajzen, 1991.p.181). They
are typically captured via verbal statements on individuals’ likelihood, desire, or plan to
perform a specific act in appropriate circumstances (Armitage&Conner, 2001). Thus, the
affective and cognitive bases temporally influence the behavioural base in this view.
In contrast, neuropsychological attitude research and emotion theory tend to
emphasize the temporal influence of the affective base. Their expectations are mainly
derived from evolutionary psychology. In this view, individuals generally do not have the
time, energy, or ability to cognitively process all environmental information; instead, they
navigate on rules of thumb. In non-routine contexts, affective reactions are the rules of
thumb to navigate on (Izard, 2009.p.5; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). In this view, therefore,
the affective base informs cognitions and motivates for action, thus it influences both the
cognitive and behavioural bases of attitude (see also Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000;
Haidt, 2001; Kunda, 1990; Talmi & Firth, 2007).
In contrast to the two positions discussed above, cognitive dissonance theory
(Festinger, 1954) would argue for the primacy of behaviour in attitude change. Building
on cognitive dissonance theory, commitment theorists (e.g., Brickman, 1987; Brown,
1996; O’Reilly & Caldwell, 1981) have formulated a ‘behavioural’ view on how a
commitment is formed. A commitment, in this view, is a post-hoc rationalization for
behaviour already exerted.
Can we think of a model where all of the assumptions of these models hold
simultaneously? It appears that both cognitive dissonance theory (behaviour ?
cognition) and theory of planned behaviour assumptions (cognition? behaviour) may
hold simultaneously in a reciprocal causal relationship. If this relationship exists, there is
still room for a third variable (the affective base of attitude) which influences them both.
After all, momentary attitudinal reactions to objects first tend to be encoded by the
subcortical brain because of the affective learningwhich has come before.2 Cognitive and
behavioural types of information then ‘overwrite’ the initial affective information but are
nevertheless ‘coloured’ by it (Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Haidt, 2001; Kunda, 1990;
Talmi & Firth, 2007). The resulting causal microstructure of commitment is displayed in
Figure 1 below. Note that affective information may temporally influence other types of
attitudinal information fromonemoment to the next even though the rate of change in the
affect trajectory as a whole is slower (Hypothesis 1a). These two notions (cross-lagged
influence vs. the shape of the trajectory as a whole) are analytically unrelated.
Hypothesis 2a: In the dynamic microstructure of commitment, the cognitive and
behavioural bases of attitude reciprocally influence one another over
time within persons.
2We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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Hypothesis 2b: In the dynamic microstructure of commitment, the affective base of
attitude in the previous period influences the cognitive and behavioural
base of attitude in the next period within persons.
Existing meta-analyses on attitudes have revealed the affective and cognitive bases of
attitudemight be inconsistent (e.g., negative feelings, yet positive beliefs) especiallywhen
attitudes are unstable (see Cooke & Sheeran, 2004; Kraus, 1995; Glasman & Albarracın,
2006). To expose the dynamic microstructure of commitment, it is therefore useful to
look for situations where attitudes are not yet crystallized and a new stance needs to be
found. Such situations are likely encountered in organizational entry and organizational
exit situations. We therefore choose these entrants and exiters as samples to test our
hypotheses.
Methods
Entrants and exiters samples
WechoseDutch and FlemishPh.D. graduates in their final phases of their Ph.D. projects as
an initial subject pool (N = 277). This group generally has a programmed end-of-contract
date with the alma mater university. In this way, a sample of entrants joining new
organizations and a sample of exiters leaving their alma maters could be extracted from a
single pool of individuals. We chose to focus either on the episode of exiting (where we
measured only the exiter’s commitment to the organization one is leaving) or on the
episode of entering (where wemeasured only the commitment to the organization one is
joining). Those who joined new organizations between January and October 2008 were
selected as ‘entrants’ (N = 72; 26% of the initial subject pool), while participants were
selected as exiters if their exit date would still fall between November 2008 and February
2009 (N = 23; 8% of the initial subject pool). Other participants were discarded because
they did not experience an exit or entry episode (e.g., theywere still finishing their Ph.D’s
with their alma mater universities, were promoted by their alma maters, or no longer
responded to our e-mails). Sampled entrants and exiters ranged from a wide range of
scientific disciplines, came from all 17 universities in the Netherlands (74%) and Flanders
Note: for clarity purposes, this figure does not show concurrent correlations.
T represents baseline time, T-1 represents baseline time minus one.
Cognition
TimeT-1 T
Behaviour
Affect
Cognition
Behaviour
Affect
Figure 1. Hypothesized within-person effects in the causal microstructure of commitment. Note. For
clarity purposes, this figure does not show concurrent correlations. T represents baseline time, T1
represents baseline time minus one.
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(26%) and had roughly equal proportions of females (entrants: 53% female; exiters: 57%
female). They were all in the age category between 26 and 35. There was no significant
effect of scientific discipline on the within-subject mean level of commitment towards
their new organizations (F = .22; n.s.). Likewise, university of origin did not have a
significant effect on the (trajectory) average level of commitment (F = 1.5; n.s.). In the
Dutch system (and to some extent in the Flemish system as well), Ph.D. students are
formally acknowledged as ‘employees’. Their status is closer to that of faculty than that of a
student.
Research design for sample 1: Entrants
Considering our interest in how affective, cognitive, and behavioural types of
information combine to form trajectories of commitment, we applied an experience
sampling design where the duration of the research is relatively long and the number
measurement waves is relatively high. We chose weekly measurements because they
seem frequent enough to capture change during organizational entry and exit, but not
so frequent to be burdensome. Thus, we performed around 25 weekly measurements
across a time frame of half a year. As we were interested in trajectory histories before
and after formal employment, we started measuring organizational commitment
4 weeks prior to entering the new organization in our sample of entrants (N = 72). In
the sample of entrants, recorded commitment histories had an average of 14
measurement occasions (SD = 7.7); 36% of the respondents yielded histories with
more than 20 completed measurement occasions. The entrants’ sample had a total
number of 994 observations.
Research design for sample 2: Exiters
In our sample of exiters, we started around 11 weeks before the end of the
employment contract and continued measurement up until 11 weeks after the formal
end of the employment contract. In the sample of exiters (N = 23), respondents
yielded patterns with an average of 12 measurement occasions (SD = 5.1); 17% yielded
histories with more than 17 completed exit patterns; one participant reached a number
of 20 completed sessions. The total number of observations in the exiters sample
amounts to 273.
Data collection procedure
To contact this pool of Ph.D. graduates, we sent all Dutch and Flemish Ph.D. candidates in
their final years an invitation e-mail. The incentive for continued participation was that
participants would receive 1 Euro payment for every completed session. To control for
selection bias on our main construct (commitment), our initial call for participation
contained two links to a sign-up questionnaire. One stated ‘Yes, I belong to the target
population, and I want to participate’, and the other stated ‘Yes, I belong to the target
population, but I do not want to participate’. The non-response link directed to a 5-item
survey measuring organizational commitment to their alma maters (employing univer-
sities), general job satisfaction, and supervisor satisfaction. Independent samples t-test
showed that there was no significant difference between non-participants (N = 92) and
initial participants (N = 277) on organizational commitment (t = .65; n.s.), supervisor
satisfaction (t = 1.5; n.s.), or overall satisfaction (t = .26; n.s.). Given these results, we
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feel confident that no self-selection effects had occurred on our focal variable to bias our
results.
After inclusion in the research sample, participants received weekly invitations to
respond by e-mail prompting them to open a hyperlink which referred them to an
online work experience monitor, called LOCUST (i.e., Longitudinal Occupational States
Tracker). LOCUST is a console running on a web server that was especially built for
temporal data gathering. Before starting the first LOCUST session, a baseline
questionnaire (response for entrants: N = 69; for exiters: N = 15) inquired after stable
personal characteristics (i.e., gender, Big-5 personality traits, positive and negative
affectivity, and job expectations). Upon completion of all 25 sessions, participants filled
out a follow-up questionnaire in English asking for experiential and situational
information (i.e., job satisfaction, perceived organizational support, met expectations,
Person-Organization fit). The latter questionnaire was filled out by 53 entrants and
eight exiters. A summary of the total of four survey moments used in our research is
presented in Table 1.
LOCUST is built based on a temporal philosophywhere the respondent can see his/her
own trajectory as it takes shape over time. Our reason for invoking pattern-based (instead
of point-based) responses is that we wanted to create a more temporally sensitive
measurement instrument. This measurement procedure is a particular form of self--
anchored scalingwhichminimizes the chance that change or disruption is reportedwhile
there is actually no real change going on (Hofmans, Theuns, & Van Acker, 2009; Solinger,
Van Olffen, Roe, & Hofmans, 2013).
High-frequency measurement of organizational commitment
We have chosen to develop a new 3-item Commitment Attitude Scale (called 3CAS) for
conceptual and practical reasons. That is, the 3CAS measure that we used is specifically
geared to fit the tripartite attitudes perspective and the challenges of an experience
sampling (25 weekly measures) research design. To avoid the (anticipated) massive
sample attrition, we decided to use single items for each attitude base. Note that this
practice is more easily allowed in experience sampling settings where the function of
reliability is in the service of temporal validity (e.g., de Boer et al., 2004; Fisher&To, 2012;
Mehl & Conner, 2012).
For sake of comparability and content validity, these single items were carefully
crafted to closely parallel those that appear in other measures of commitment
(Allen & Meyer, 1990; Mowday et al., 1982). As such, the affective base of attitude
was phrased as ‘What I feel about [my organization]: I am proud’, the cognitive base
was phrased as ‘What I think about [my organization]: I belong to it’, and
behavioural base was phrased as ‘What I do for [my organization]: I engage’[par-
ticipate].3 Each time we measured these items, the upper left of the window
contained a brief instruction on the item content (e.g., To ‘engage’ is have a
readiness to act for the organization’s benefit, e.g., do what is needed). Further,
the instruction contained some information on how the ‘organization’ should be
interpreted: ‘You can think of your organization as your department, the manage-
3Note that the phrase ‘I engage’ is a translation of an active Dutch expression [‘ik doe mee’], which might also be translated as: ‘I
join in’, ‘I take part’, or ‘I participate’.
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ment, but also the sum of all documents, structure, people and symbols that
represent it.’ Lastly, the instruction emphasized that it is a momentary measure:
‘Score according to how it is for you at this moment’ The resulting 3-item
Commitment Attitude Scale (called 3CAS) used a 0–100 response format (see de
Boer et al., 2004). Note that using a 0–100 slider is a best practice for experience
sampling research (Fisher & To, 2012).
Construct validity
To address anticipated concerns with respect to the construct validity of 3CAS, we
performed a series of tests. First, we used a single-item question asking for the
respondent’s mood as a time-varying criterion to assess the construct validity of the
single-item measures. This measure was based on a Visual Analogue Scale (de Boer et al.,
2004) and simply reads: ‘What is yourmood at themoment’ (0: very bad; 100: very good).
The regression coefficients of a two-level regression model (with measurements nested
within persons) showed that mood–affect (F = 41.2; p < .000), mood–cognition
(F = 4.8; p = .038), and mood–behaviour relations (F = .79; n.s.) reflected sharply
decreasing covariations. To corroborate these findings, we computed simple partial
correlations between the person-centred scores of mood and each of the attitude bases,
controlling for the two other bases. Again, mood–affect (r = .25; p < .000), mood–
cognition (r = .10; p = .002), and mood–behaviour (r = .07; p = .04) showed sharply
decreasing covariations. This confirms the general tenets of attitudes research (e.g., the
affect-infusionmodel; see Forgas &George, 2001), namely that mood states most strongly
influence the experience of other types of affect, then impact on cognition (e.g., through
misattribution effects) and then in the last instance impact on actions (See e.g., Forgas &
George, 2001; Schwarz&Clore, 1983, amongmany others). This confirms our confidence
that the three single-item questions indeed tap into affective, cognitive, and behavioural
bases of attitude.
Second, to check whether the combined measure indeed measures organizational
commitment, we computed the trajectory average commitment score per participant
(i.e., averaged across components and across time) and correlated it with a set of known
commitment covariates for which meta-analytic findings are available. In the measure-
ment of variables in the ‘nomological net’ of organizational commitment, we have
chosen brief questionnaires to limit the compliance burden as much as possible. To save
space, the measures and the correlations with the 3CAS measure are summarized in
Table 2.
As can be seen in Table 2, the relationships for the entrants and exiters are highly
similar to those found in previous meta-analytic research. Note that, because of the small
number of exiters, some correlations are non-significant, although their magnitude is
generally in linewith the relationships found for the entrants in themeta-analytic findings
(only the correlation with positive affect for the exiters differs). As support for the high
degree of convergence between the relationships of the entrants, exiters, and the
meta-analytic findings, the correlation coefficient between the corresponding correla-
tions equals .92 (N = 11; p < .001) between entrants and exiters, .87 (N = 12; p < .001)
between entrants and meta-analytic findings, and .77 (N = 11; p = .005) between exiters
and meta-analytic findings (see Kuppens, Oravecz, and Tuerlinckx, 2010 for a similar
procedure). In sum, we feel we found sufficient support for construct validity
(convergent/nomological validity) to proceed with our 3CAS measure as an alternative
to conventional commitment scales.
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Results
Sample 1: Entrants
Figure 2A illustrateswhat the different logic of change in the affective base of attitudemay
empirically look like. For example, newcomer #7 (Figure 2A) reacts to Christmas break by
reducing the cognition and behaviour, but not affect. This illustrates the different types of
change involved: The cognitive and behavioural base of attitude (based on reasoning)
need not remain high during a holiday break while this holiday event is irrelevant for the
affective base of attitude (association-based learning).
To test Hypothesis 1a – the affective base of the attitudemicrostructure has a slower
rate of change than cognitive base of the attitude – we first carried out a series of
multilevel regression analyses in which we predicted affect, cognition, and behaviour
trajectories on the basis of t, t2, and t3.These trajectories reflect the relative rates of change
in the affective, cognitive, and behavioural bases of the dynamic microstructure of
attitude. Moreover, we allowed trajectories of t, t2, and t3 to vary across individuals (i.e.,
random intercept, random slopes models). This is based on previous research that has
shown that individuals differ widely in the type of commitment trajectories they follow
during organizational entry (Solinger et al., 2013).
Entrants
Note that for the entrants, the time-variable was centred around the moment the person
entered the organization (i.e., t = 0 refers to the start of the job; t = 1 refers to the week
Newcomer #36: A relatively stable pattern,
with slightly declining affect
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Figure 2. (A) Two examples of individual entrants. Newcomer # 7 reacts to Christmas Break.
Newcomer #36: A relatively stable pattern, with slightly declining affect. (B) Two examples of individual
exiters. Exiter #17: A volatile reaction to leaving the office with affect lingering high. Exiter # 21; affect
follows a different path after filing for unemployment.
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after they started the job). This ensures that the time variable has exactly the same
meaning for everyone and trajectories are comparable between persons (Hox, 2010). For
exploratory purposes, the behavioural base of attitude was also included in these tests.
We then compared the random slopes that resulted from these analyses using
paired-sample t-tests. The results of these tests revealed that for the entrants, the linear,
quadratic, and cubic slope coefficients were significantly higher for the cognitive and
behavioural base of attitude than for the affective base (see Table 3). However, because
the linear, quadratic, and cubic slopes are not orthogonal, the three effects are to some
extent related (the fact that the linear and quadratic slopes followed the same pattern of
findings is partly implied by this). As a result, the cubic slope matters most. Our results
show that the cubic slope for cognition and behaviour was significantly larger than that
the cubic slopes for affect. As can be seen in Table 3, we demonstrated slower rates of
change of the affective base of attitude, thus supporting Hypothesis 1a.
To test Hypothesis 1b –within person trajectories of the cognitive and behavioural
bases of the attitude microstructure correlate more strongly than do the cogni-
tive-affective and behavioural-affective trajectories – we computed correlations
between the person-centred scores of the affective, cognitive, and behavioural bases of
attitude. Because we wanted to test the extent to which the respective trajectories
resemble each other, we first mean-centred each of the trajectories of the affective,
cognitive, and behavioural bases of attitude per participant using their person-specific
averages (Hox, 2010). Such a procedure fixes the average level for eachperson on all three
attitudinal bases of commitment to 0, and, as a result, the remaining variance pertains
solely to the shape (and not the level) of the three trajectories. To then test whether the
cognitive and behavioural base of attitude show greater similarity across time than
cognitive-affective and behavioural-affective trajectories, we computed the correlations
between the three person-centred attitude trajectories. Finally, we used Steiger’s Z-test
(Steiger, 1980) to statistically compare these correlations.
These correlations are shown in Table 4 below the diagonal for the entrants and above
the diagonal for the exiters. For the entrants, trajectories of cognitive and behavioural base
of attitude relate more strongly to each other than to the affective base of attitude: rcog-beh
is significantly higher than raff-beh, z(69) = 2.567; p = .010, and marginally higher than
raff-cog, z(69) = 1.733; p = .083; there is no significant difference between raff-cog and
raff-beh, z(69) = .881; p = .378. This supports Hypothesis 1b in the Entrants sample.
Finally, to test Hypothesis 2a and 2b concerning the temporal influence of bases of
attitude in the dynamic microstructure, we performed a series of multilevel regression
Table 3. The rate of affective change compared to cognitive and behavioural change
Entrants Exiters
Affect
trajectory
Cognition
trajectory
Behaviour
trajectory
Affect
trajectory
Cognition
trajectory
Behaviour
trajectory
t 1.187cog beh 2.748aff 2.190aff .131beh .762 1.109aff
t2 0.096cog beh 0.208aff 0.164aff 0.009 0.003 0.009
t3 0.002cog beh 0.005aff 0.004aff 0.001 0.001 0.005
Note. The numbers indicate the average time-sensitivities (i.e., averaged across individuals), that is: The
average of the random slope coefficients of the linear, quadratic, and cubic time component in predicting
the level of each attitude base over time. Superscripts refer to significant differences with the respective
coefficients of the other attitude bases (Paired-sample t-tests).
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analyses to test for cross-lagged relationships. The multilevel nature of these models
allowed us to account for non-independence in the data resulting from having multiple
measurements per person (i.e., the data have a nested structure with measurements
nestedwithin persons) (Hox, 2010). In thesemultilevel regression analyses,we predicted
for the three bases of attitude the score on time t (i.e., baseline time) from the score on t1
(i.e., baseline time minus one) and from the score on the other two attitude bases on t1.
Because Hypotheses 2a and 2b pertain to thewithin-person level (i.e., they refer to the
temporal influence relationships in the dynamic microstructure), we first removed all
between-person variation from the data. This was done by in a first step averaging the
affective, cognitive, and behavioural bases into a single commitment component and by
then centring the three time-lagged commitment components around the person-specific
mean of this average commitment component. Using this type of centring, between-
person differences in the level of the three commitment components (as a set) were
removed from the data, while within-person differences in the level of the three
commitment components were retained (note that differences in level between the three
components would also be removed when using traditional group-mean centring as each
componentwould then be centred relative to its ownperson-specific average).Moreover,
random slopes were tested on a one-on-one basis using the likelihood ratio test and only
those random slopes that were significant were included in the final model (Hox, 2010).
The results of these analyses are shown in Table 5 (only the fixed effects are reported).
Regarding Hypothesis 2a – in the dynamic microstructure of commitment, the
cognitive and behavioural bases of attitude reciprocally influence one another over
timewithin persons – the cognitive base of attitude at time t1 predicted the behavioural
base at time t, but there was no reciprocal temporal influence (i.e., the behavioural base
did not impact on the cognitive base of attitude). Thus, there is mixed support for
Hypothesis 2a. The results of our tests are shown in Table 5.
Table 4. Within-person correlations for the dynamic microstructure of commitment
Affect trajectory Cognition trajectory Behaviour trajectory
Affect trajectory – .40** .45**
Cognition trajectory .63** – .76**
Behaviour trajectory .58** .76** –
Note. *p < .05; **p < .005. Numbers below the diagonal apply to entrants; above the diagonal: exiters.
Table 5. Within-person influence in the dynamic microstructure of commitment
Entrants Exiters
Affectt Cognitiont Beht Affectt Cognitiont Beht
Intercept 75.18*** 76.37*** 78.73*** 64.65*** 62.24*** 64.09***
Affectt1 .56*** .05 .03 .33** .05 .14
Cognitiont1 .00 .53*** .12* .21* .37** .43**
Beht1 .03 .04 .35*** .09* .25* .36*
Note. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .10. Beh, the behavioural base of attitude; t represents
baseline time, t1 represents baseline time minus one.
16 Omar N. Solinger et al.
Regarding Hypothesis 2b – in the dynamic microstructure of commitment, the
affective base of attitude in the previous period influences the cognitive and
behavioural base of attitude within persons in the next period – the results were
unsupportive. The affective base of attitude on time t1 did not predict cognition on time
t, nor behaviour on time t (see Table 5).
Sample 2: Exiters
We followed the exact same testing procedures as used in the Entrants sample. Toprepare
the data for hypothesis testing, we centred time around the moment the person left the
organization (i.e., t = 0 refers to the moment the person leaves the job; t = 1 refers to
the week before he/she left the job). Figure 2B shows two Exiter trajectories of the three
bases of commitment. Exiter #17 (Figure 2B) illustrates rapid and volatile decline in
cognition and behaviour, while decline in affect is more conservative (for slower rates of
change).
Our test of Hypothesis 1a – the affective base of the attitude microstructure has a
slower pace of change than the cognitive base of the attitude – shows that only the
difference between the linear slope of affective and behavioural bases was statistically
significant (see Table 3). However, this is partly due to the low sample size (N = 23),
which causes the statistical power of this test to be low. Closer inspection of Table 3
indeed shows that for the Exiters, a similar pattern of slower rates of change in the
affective base of attitude can be observed as for the Entrants, thereby providing support
for Hypothesis 1a.
The results of our tests of Hypothesis 1b – trajectories of the cognitive and
behavioural bases of the attitude microstructure correlate more strongly than do the
cognitive-affective and behavioural–affective trajectories – can be inspected above the
diagonal inTable 4. A similar pattern showsup for the Exiters as compared to the Entrants;
rcog-beh is significantly higher than raff-cog, z(20) = 2.074; p = .038, and marginally higher
than raff-beh, z(20) = 1.784; p = .074; raff-cog and raff-beh do not differ significantly, z
(20) = .343; p = .732. In all, for both the Entrants and the Exiters, our results indicate that
trajectories of the cognitive and behavioural base of attitude in the dynamic microstruc-
ture relate more strongly to each other than to the affective base of attitude, which
supports Hypothesis 1b.
Regarding Hypothesis 2a – in the dynamic microstructure of commitment, the
cognitive and behavioural bases of attitude reciprocally influence one another over
time –we observed that the cognitive base of attitude at time t1 predicted behaviour at
time t, while behaviour at time t1 predicted cognition at time t (see Table 5). This
supports Hypothesis 2a. However, considering the evidence in the sample of Entrants,
there is only mixed support for a reciprocal influence relationship overall. In both the
Entrants and Exiters samples, it appears that the cognitive base of attitude is the strongest
and most consistent ‘predictor’ in the dynamic microstructure of commitment. In both
samples, the cognitive attitude base temporally influenced the behavioural base of
attitude.
Regarding Hypothesis 2b – in the dynamic microstructure of commitment, the
affective base of attitude in the previous period influences the cognitive and
behavioural base of attitude in the next period – the results were unsupportive in the
Exiters sample as well. Taken together, Hypothesis 2b is clearly rejected in the two
samples. In fact, among Exiters, both the cognitive and the behavioural base of attitude
influenced the affective base.
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Discussion
The purpose of this paper was to develop new theory on how the basic ingredients of
attitude – affect, cognition, and behaviour – combine to form trajectories of commitment.
We have now empirically tested some key features of what we call the ‘dynamic
microstructure’ of commitment. First, within-person change of affective attitudinal
information is indeed slower than the within-person change of cognitive and behavioural
information (H1a). Based on different types of learning (associative vs. reflective), the
affective base of attitude follows a different ‘logic’ over time (i.e., has a clearly distinct
within-person change trajectory) compared to cognitive and behavioural bases of attitude
(H1b). Further, individuals seem to follow their ‘minds’ rather than their ‘hearts’ when
(un)committing to an organization (H2a/b). This result supports the perspectives of
cognitive dissonance theory and the theory of planned behaviour more than the
neuropsychological theory to attitude development.
Implications for tripartite attitude theory
These findings contribute to our current knowledge of the tripartite theory of attitude.
First, the relative weight of the affective, cognitive, and behavioural bases change over
time and context and they do so at different rates (trajectories). During organizational
entry, the cognitive andbehavioural bases adjust faster than the affective base becauseone
still needs to affectively bond with the organization. During organizational exit, the
behavioural base is the fastest to adjust while the affective base tends to linger on for a
while at higher levels. As an aside, the notion of an affective ‘residue’ of commitment after
leaving is consistent with prior evidence that a form of post-exit sentiment may endure
after incumbents have left their organizations (cf. Baeyens, Crombez, Van den Bergh, &
Eelen, 1988; Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Sutton, 1987; Walsh & Glynn, 2008). The fact that
within-person change of affective information is significantly slower than within-person
change in cognitive and behavioural information resonates with the dual-process view of
attitude. Future studies on the distinction of affect and cognition in other job attitudes,
such as satisfaction (e.g., Schleicher et al., 2004; Weiss, 2002) and organizational
identification (e.g., Johnson et al., 2012) will want to pay attention to this distinction.
Second, attitudinal change at two different rates (purportedly coming from associa-
tion- and reasoning-based learning) may have different adaptive functions for the
individual: It helps to accommodate the sometimes conflicting demands posed by
emotional investments in groups and individual goal pursuit in times of change. This is
consistent with earlier work on disbanding organizations, which has shown that there
tend to be two seemingly paradoxical processes at work: Disbanding and reconnecting
(Sutton, 1987). The controlled learning system (the cognitive base of attitude) aids
adaptation by securing the individual’s long-term goals, in this case by disbanding a
defunct commitment. At the same, the automatic learning system (the affective base of
commitment) helps to ‘reconnect’ with past identities, colleagues, and organizational
objects (cf. Munro, 1998; Sutton, 1987; Wildschut, Sedikides, Arndt, & Routledge, 2006).
Implications for commitment theory
Themost conspicuous finding for commitment theory is that the cognitive base of attitude
had the strongest and the most consistent temporal influence on the other bases of
attitude in times of transition. The results are especially telling in the organizational entry
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situation where it is only the cognitive base of attitude that has a temporal influence over
the two other bases of commitment. The primacy of cognition may, however, be specific
to the contexts organizational entry and exit. Not committing to a new organization, one
economically depends on or holding on to a defunct commitment after exit is
maladaptive. Some degree of cognitive effort is therefore called for to steer the
commitment attitude in a direction, which is more congruent with the long-term goals of
the individual. Finally, it is also possible that a time interval of 1 week used in this study is
too large to pick up on the temporal influence of the affective base. That said, our results
currently suggest that it is possible that affective information is of little importance for the
within-person development of commitment. This idea supports the notion of commit-
ment as a cognition-based attitude, where (un)committing oneself tends to be based on
deliberation (e.g., choice) rather than on automaticity or behavioural routine (supporting
the view of Klein et al., 2012). Committing oneself to the organization remains first and
foremost a conscious choice (a pledge) to dedicate oneself and serve the purposes of
organization (Solinger et al., 2008). Feelings of pride with respect to the organization are
not irrelevant, but appear only later in the organizational entry process.
Fostering commitment
Our results provide two angles to thinking about how commitment can be fostered. The
first angle is based on the finding that the affective base of attitude is more resistant to
change. Based on this information, practitioners are advised to invest in making an
emotional connectionwith the employee if a long-term investment of the employee in the
organization is called for. Thus, create units with an upbeat team spirit, uphold satisfying
relationships with colleagues, and invest in inspiring (e.g., charismatic) leaders. Second,
given the apparent primacy of cognition in times of transition, one should also try to
communicate well, provide clear and detailed information, and secure the employee’s
long-term goals. In other words, it is safest to make use of both emotional and rational
appeals in attempts to foster and uphold organizational commitment. This is, in fact,
consistent with earlier work on attitudes, which has shown that among attitudes which
have a strong ‘cognitive’ emphasis, one should use both emotive and rational appeals to
foster them (cf. Edwards, 1990). This is different for employees who have already left the
organization. Edwards (1990) found that for affective attitudes (i.e., those purely based on
affective information), it suffices to use emotive appeals. Alumni officerswhomust to gain
buy-in from alumni are therefore advised to focus purely on emotional appeals – create an
alumni network with an upbeat espirit de corps, instill feelings of pride and work on
positive, warm relationships.
Limitations
First, our exiter group consisted of Ph.D. candidates leaving their almamaters. It might be
that the peculiarities of this setting have influenced our results. One peculiarity is the
reputational value that universities have for their departing doctoral students and the
second is the nature of the university-doctoral student bond which generally is that of a
relational contract, namely that of mentorship, nurturing, and professional education.
Such peculiarities make generalization of particular findings (e.g., the ‘nostalgic’ rise of
affect observed just before the date of exit) questionable. For example, exit episodes in
more transactional worker–organization contracts may not show this pattern.
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The second limitation relates to our single-itemmeasurement. Because of this practice,
it is possible that our single-item measures have not fully (or selectively) captured the
content domains our constructs of interest (affect, cognition, and behaviour). That said,
our choice for single-item measurement resulted from the practical trade-off one always
faces in high-density experience sampling research between enhancing the reliability of a
pattern (throughmany waves of measurement) versus that of a point (throughmulti-item
scales; see also Fisher & To, 2012; Solinger et al., 2013). For this reason, single items are
relatively more easily endorsed in experience sampling research compared to cross-sec-
tional research (e.g., Fisher & To, 2012; Mehl & Conner, 2012). Previous research shows
that single-item questions have sufficient construct validity (de Boer et al., 2004; Wanous
& Hudy, 2001; Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997 but see also van Hooff, Geurts, Kompier,
& Taris, 2007). Further, we carefully selected those words that have literally appeared in
previous commitment scales (i.e., Allen &Meyer, 1990; Mowday et al., 1982). Moreover,
our single items showed construct validity in relation to (time varying) measures ofmood,
which also implies sufficient temporal reliability (Fisher & To, 2012). Having said all this,
further exploration of the dynamic microstructure of commitment using different items
(single andmulti-item) is called for. Also, it is still to be investigated how the 3CASmeasure
of commitment relates to previously established scales of commitment (cf. Allen&Meyer,
1990; Klein, Cooper, Molloy, & Swanson, 2014; Mowday et al., 1982).
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined how the classic elements of attitude – affect, cognition, and
behaviour – combine to form trajectories of commitment. We discovered that this
‘microstructure’ of commitment is not fixed, but can change over time and context.
Further, in times of transition, the change of affective information is relatively slow, while
the change of cognitive and behavioural information is relatively fast. This difference
exists for a reason: It makes for a flexible attitude, which allows individuals to balance the
need to both feel part of the group and the need to pursue personal long-term goals in the
vicissitudes of the workplace. During these instances, (un)committing has a controlled,
self-regulatory quality.
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